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STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CHINA:
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ABSTRACT. In recent years, a range of western jurisdictions has introduced re-
forms designed to restrict and guide judicial discretion at sentencing. The reforms
enacted include mandatory sentencing laws and guiding statutes prescribing sen-
tencing purposes and principles as well as important aggravating and mitigating
factors. However, formal guidelines are the most promising and well-studied inno-
vation. We may now add China to the growing list of countries that have recognized
the utility of guidelines. Over the past decade, China has slowly developed sentencing
guidelines for its courts. The new guidelines contain both general directions with
respect to the determination of sentence as well as speciﬁc numerical guidelines for
common oﬀences. The guidelines do not follow the approach taken by the US
schemes, many of which employ a two-dimensional sentencing grid. Instead, China
has adopted a strategy consisting of “Starting Point” sentences which are then ad-
justed by the court to reﬂect relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. This ap-
proach is much closer to the guidelines developed in England and Wales and those
proposed but not yet implemented in New Zealand and Israel. In this article, we
explore the new Chinese guidelines and provide a limited comparative analysis with
guidelines in other jurisdictions. England and Wales is selected as the principal
comparator since it has developed and implemented a comprehensive system con-
sisting of both oﬀence-speciﬁed guidelines as well as generic guidelines.
I INTRODUCTION
In recent years,many jurisdictions have introduced reformsdesigned to
restrict and guide judicial discretion at sentencing.1 The reforms en-
acted include mandatory sentencing laws and guiding statutes pre-
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scribing sentencing purposes and principles as well as important
aggravating andmitigating factors. However, formal guidelines are the
most promising and well-studied innovation. Minnesota was the ﬁrst
jurisdiction to implement detailed sentencing guidelines for courts.2 At
sentencing in that (and other states), courts must follow the guideline
sentence ranges or ﬁnd “substantial and compelling” reasons to depart
therefrom. Since the creation of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Commission in 1975, many other US states have adopted comparable
schemes. In addition, advisory or statutorily binding guidelines have
been implemented or proposed in a range of other jurisdictions,
including England andWales, Scotland, SouthKorea, Israel and,most
recently, Uganda.3 To the growing list of countries that have recog-
nized the utility of guidelines, we may now add China.
Over the past decade, China has slowly developed sentencing guide-
lines for its courts. In 2014, after ten years’ development, the Supreme
Peoples’ Court (SPC) issued its “Sentencing Guidelines for Common
Crimes” (hereafter “Guidelines”): the ﬁrst set of comprehensive, national
guidelines in the jurisdiction.4 The new guidelines contain both general
directions with respect to the determination of sentence as well as speciﬁc
numerical guidelines for 15 common oﬀences. The guidelines do not
follow the approach taken by the US schemes, many of which employ a
two-dimensional sentencing grid.5 Instead, China has adopted a strategy
consisting of “Starting Point” sentences which are then adjusted by the
court to reﬂect relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. This ap-
proach is much closer to the guidelines developed in England andWales
and those proposed but not yet implemented inNewZealand and Israel.6
2 See R. Frase, ‘Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003’, in M Tonry (ed),
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
3 For information on these jurisdictions, see, respectively, A. Ashworth and J.V.
Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013); H. Park, ‘The Basic Features of the First Korean Sentencing
Guidelines’, (2010) 22 Federal Sentencing Reporter 262–271; J. Kamuzze, ‘An Insight
into Uganda’s New Sentencing Guidelines: A Replica of Individualisation?’, (2014)
27(1) Federal Sentencing Reporter 47–55.
4 关于常见犯罪的量刑指导意见; 法发[2013] 14号 (Fafa [2013] No. 14) (issued 23
December 2013, validated 1 January 2014), at: http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?
cgid=221534&lib=law.
5 For example, in Minnesota, see discussion in R Frase (n 2 above).
6 Information on the New Zealand experience can be found in W. Young and A.
King, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Sentencing Guidelines: A Comparison of
England and Wales and New Zealand’, in A. Ashworth and J.V. Roberts (n 3
above); for the sentencing law of Israel and discussion of the Israeli experience, see J.
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In this article, we explore the new Chinese guidelines and provide a
limited comparative analysis with other jurisdictions. Part II sum-
marizes recent sentencing trends regarding the use of custody and
notes the historical origins, evolution and legal framework of the
2014 Guidelines in China. This is followed in Part III by a compar-
ison between the Chinese and English sentencing guidelines. England
and Wales is selected as the principal comparator since it has devel-
oped and implemented a comprehensive system consisting of both
oﬀence-speciﬁed guidelines as well as generic guidelines.7 We com-
pare the institutional features, principles and sentencing methodolo-
gies in the two jurisdictions. Part IV discusses the compliance
requirements in the two jurisdictions. Some challenges regarding the
2014 Guidelines are discussed in part V.
II RECENT SENTENCING TRENDS AND ORIGINS
OF THE 2014 GUIDELINES
2.1 Use of Custody as a Sanction
Most sentencing guidelines focus on the use of custody, often with a
view to constraining rising prison populations or to ensure that only
the most serious cases are committed to prison. Indeed, an increasing
prison population is often a trigger for the introduction of statutorily-
binding guidelines. It is unclear whether this problem played a role in
launching the Chinese guidelines, but it is apparent that China em-
ploys imprisonment as a sanction more frequently than most com-
mon law countries, with the exception of the United States. The
imprisonment rate in most western jurisdictions is around 100 per
100,000 population, with the US recording a rate signiﬁcantly higher.
Data released by the International Centre for Prison Studies (ICPS)
reveal that as of mid-2013, China had a rate of 124 per 100,000
population.8 In terms of the use of custody relative to other sanc-
tions, China also stands out. In England and Wales, approximately
Footnote 6 continued
V. Roberts and O. Gazal-Ayal, ‘Sentencing Reform in Israel: An Analysis of the
Statutory Reforms of 2012’, (2013) 46 Israel Law Review 455–479.
7 For analysis of the sentencing guidelines in England and Wales, see A. Ashworth
and J.V. Roberts (n 3 above) and J.V. Roberts, ‘Sentencing Guidelines in England
and Wales: Recent Developments and Emerging Issues’, (2013) 76 Law and Con-
temporary Problems 1–25.
8 See the ICPS World Prison Brief, at: http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/china.
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10% of convictions in 2013 resulted in a term of immediate custody.9
In contrast, over half the convictions in China the same year resulted
in a term of imprisonment. The custodial population has also risen
signiﬁcantly in recent years; in less than a decade (2001–2010) the
prison population rose by 16%.10
2.2 Origins of the New Guidelines
In 1979, China began to reform its criminal justice system by pro-
mulgating a new criminal law (1979 CL)11 and Criminal Procedure
Law (1979 CPL).12 These two statutes form the basis of the current
regulatory framework on judicial decision-making. As is the practice
in almost all other civil law jurisdictions, Chinese judges are bound by
the written law in which the constituents of criminal activities and
sanctions and the concepts of seriousness and culpability are deﬁned.
The previous sentencing regime suﬀered from a number of deﬁcien-
cies. First, the statutory sentencing ranges were very broad, allowing
for a great deal of judicial discretion. For example, the sentence range
for “normal” robbery ran from three to ten years’ imprisonment. The
sentence range for cases of robbery with aggravating factors rose
from ten years’ imprisonment up to the death penalty, and judges had
great discretion to sentence within these broad outer limits. At the
same time, the scheme lacked a comprehensive methodology to guide
trial judges in the exercise of their discretion.
The ﬁrst defect was somewhat mitigated by judicial interpretations
of the CPL. Since 1979, the head of the judicial system in China –
including both the Supreme Peoples’ Court (SPC) and the Supreme
People’s Procurate (SPP)13 – has issued 67 detailed interpretations.
These interpretations are not based on speciﬁc cases but are closer to
practice memoranda issued by appellate courts in other jurisdictions.
9 See J.V. Roberts and K. Irwin-Rogers, ‘Sentencing Practices and Trends in
England and Wales, 1999–2013’, in J.V. Roberts (ed), Exploring Sentencing Practice in
England and Wales (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
10 SPC statistics on trial court trends which are available from the authors.
11 The 1979 CL was revised in 1997 (1997 CL) and has been amended eight times
since then. The draft of Amendment IX was released on 3 November 2014. .
12 The 1979 CPL was revised in 1996 (1996 CPL) and then in 2012 (2012 CPL).
13 This is diﬀerent from the English system where the ‘judicial system’ refers to the
judiciary rather than the Crown Prosecution Service. In China, both peoples’ courts
(‘normal’ courts) and the procurates (the public prosecution service) are deemed
branches of the judicial system and there is a close degree of cooperation between the
two.
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Their function is limited to reﬁning the terms used in speciﬁc crimes
such as the meaning of “public transportation” or the range of “large
sums of money” in the deﬁnition of robbery. Little guidance was
provided to assist judges in weighing relevant sentencing factors (such
as whether the oﬀender had confessed, pleaded guilty, or performed
meritorious service).14
The second defect is the absence of a systematic methodology for
the determination of sentences. Absent such a system, individual
judges are likely to approach the determination of sentence and the
application of relevant factors in very diﬀerent ways. One of the
major consequences is likely to be a disparity in sentencing outcomes.
In the absence of a comprehensive sentencing database (such as those
found in western jurisdictions), it is hard to determine the degree of
sentencing disparity in trial courts. For this reason, it is necessary to
rely upon speciﬁc reported cases. A typical example is the Xu Ting
(许霆) case. In 2006, Xu took advantage of a malfunctioning ATM
machine in Guangdong Province to illegally withdraw more than
170,000 RMB (approximately $US 25,000). In the trial of ﬁrst in-
stance in 2007, the defendant was convicted of stealing cash from a
ﬁnancial institution. This is an aggravated form of theft and the
oﬀender was sentenced to life imprisonment. Although within the
range prescribed by law, the sentence provoked adverse public
reaction; the public considered the punishment to be excessively se-
vere.15 Under the pressure of public opinion, the sentence was sub-
sequently reduced to ﬁve years’ imprisonment in 2008.16 Prior to Xu’s
case, He Peng (何鹏), convicted of a similar oﬀence (withdrawing
429,700 RMB ($US 69, 826) in Yun’nan Province), had also been
sentenced to life imprisonment in 2002. After the commutation in Xu
Ting’s case, in 2009 the SPC required the Higher Peoples’ Court in
14 The term ‘Meritorious service’ has a speciﬁc connotation in this context. It
refers to cases where criminal suspects/defendants oﬀer assistance to investigators or
prosecutors, rather than more nonspeciﬁc exemplary conduct by the defendant.
15 For the media intervention in the Xu case and commentary, see e.g., L. Bo, ‘The
Trial of Xu Ting’ The Economic Observer Online (14 April 2008), at: http://www.
eeo.com.cn/ens/feature/2008/04/23/97760.html.
16 For details of the Xu Ting Case, see Z Yuan, ‘Xu Ting and the Era of Judicial
Discretion’ China Daily (10 August 2008), at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/
2008-05/10/content_6674712.htm.
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Yun’nan Province to order a retrial in He Peng’s case, and in the
same year, He’s penalty was reduced to eight years’ imprisonment.17
These two cases are examples of the perceived inconsistency in
sentencing practices across China, as well as the low levels of public
conﬁdence in the administration of criminal justice and, in particular,
sentencing. Recognition of these problems, as well as the need to
achieve consistency and transparency in sentencing practices across
the country led to a judicial response. In 2004, the SPC announced its
intention to improve sentencing through guidelines in the Second
Five-Year Reform Program for the Peoples’ Court (2004–2008).18
Then, in 2008, the SPC promoted the harmonization of sentencing in
12 local peoples’ courts (basic and intermediate levels).19 Two years
later, draft guidelines were issued, expanding the experiment to
peoples’ courts across the country. In 2013, the SPC revised the draft
guidelines (2014 Guidelines) and required all peoples’ courts to
stipulate detailed regulations and implement them before the end of
2014. Considering the variable legal, political and economic devel-
opments across the country as well as localized legal cultures and
traditions, the Opinions also require detailed guidelines to be issued
in accordance with local conditions. To date, 29 higher peoples’
courts have issued (or updated) detailed instructions on implementing
the 2014 Guidelines20. The following discussion focuses on the oﬃcial
guidelines issued at the central level.
The position of the 2014 Guidelines in the sentencing system in
China needs some explanation. In China the SPC is regarded as a
body that actually has a “quasi-lawmaking function”. By issuing
diﬀerent forms of documents, the SPC instructs lower courts on how
to implement the national criminal policy. These documents mainly
take four forms: regulations (guiding, including opinions and stan-
17 For details of the He Peng Case, see L. Yingqing and G. Anfei, ‘ATM “Thief”
wants compensation’ China Daily (19 January 2010), at: http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2010-01/19/content_9339444.htm.
18 第二个人民法院改革五年计划, at: http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-
provisions/second-ﬁve-year-reform-program-for-the-peoples-courts-2004-2008-cecc.
19 The structure of Chinese courts for normal criminal cases consists of four levels:
the basic peoples’ courts, the intermediate peoples’ courts, the higher peoples’ courts
and the SPC. All four levels can hold ﬁrst instance trials in accordance with the
seriousness of the crime. For an introduction to Chinese criminal procedure, see M.
McConville, Criminal Justice in China: An Empirical Inquiry (Cheltenham and
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2011).
20 The only courts in mainland China which have not issued or updated their
implementation instructions are Neimenggu and Xinjiang.
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dards), interpretations (jieshi), decisions (jueding), and replies (pifu).
They are generally named “judicial interpretations” and “semi-judi-
cial interpretations”, bound by the 1997 CL and having national
binding force. Documents directly named “interpretations” can be
used as legal basis in verdicts.
2.3 Structure of the Chinese Guidelines
The 2014 Chinese Guidelines contain four principal elements: (1)
general sentencing principles; (2) a methodology for the determina-
tion of sentence; (3) enumerated sentencing factors; and (4) speciﬁc
guidelines for 15 common oﬀences or oﬀence categories, including
traﬃc oﬀences, assault, rape, illegal conﬁnement, robbery, theft,
fraud, forcible seizure, embezzlement, extortion, obstructing an oﬃ-
cer in the discharge of his duties, aﬀray, causing a disturbance,
concealing the illegal gains or the income from illegal gains, and the
smuggling, selling, or manufacturing of prohibited drugs. The 2014
Guidelines are the ﬁrst stage of a more comprehensive national
sentencing scheme. They focus on the two forms21 of imprisonment
available to Chinese courts yet provide no guidance regarding non-
custodial penalties.22 In this respect, they fail to attain the breadth of
coverage achieved in the US and England and Wales, where guide-
lines provide assistance to courts over the range of principal sanc-
tions, including ﬁnes, community orders as well as sentences of
imprisonment.
III 2014 GUIDELINES IN COMPARISON: STRUCTURE,
OBJECTIVES AND METHOD
3.1 Structural Features
Several important structural diﬀerences exist between the Chinese
and English sentencing regimes. First, instead of establishing an
independent sentencing authority such as the Sentencing Council
(SC) for England and Wales, guidelines and related reforms in China
are promoted by and located within the SPC, the highest level of the
judiciary. The Chinese guidelines are therefore purely judicially-de-
21 Oﬀenders may be sentenced to either imprisonment or “criminal detention”.
22 As with other jurisdictions, Chinese courts may impose a range of penalties (in
addition to the two forms of imprisonment) including the death penalty, life
imprisonment, deprivation of political rights, ﬁnes, and conﬁscation of property. The
2014 Guidelines apply only to the two forms of deﬁnite terms of custody.
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rived, without input from non-judicial members or external bodies. In
contrast, the English Council, and indeed all sentencing councils and
commissions around the common law world, include non-judicial
members. Membership of the English Council includes several other
legal and criminal justice professionals as well as an academic. Sen-
tencing councils in Australia contain victim representatives as well as
practitioners and community members.23
This is an important distinction which has been much discussed in
the academic literature. It has been argued that a sentencing guide-
lines authority which lacks community or practitioner membership –
and is exclusively or predominantly judicial – will be more conser-
vative in its guidelines, and more protective of the status quo in terms
of sentencing practices.24 The claim has also been made that the
presence of community members confers a degree of legitimacy which
would otherwise be absent: the guidelines in England and Wales and
Australia reﬂect community values to a greater degree than, for
example, the exclusively judicial guidelines developed in Uganda.25
On the other hand, a purely judicial sentencing authority is likely
to attract greater support from the judiciary. Guidelines emerging
from a primarily judicial body are more likely to conform to a judicial
model of guidance and more consequently more likely to attract
judicial support. Indeed, one explanation for the emergence of
guidelines in England and Wales when they have been rejected in
other countries is that the English judges have been more accepting of
the Council since it is predominantly composed of members of the
judiciary.26
23 See discussion in A. Freiberg and K. Gelb (eds), Penal Populism, Sentencing
Councils and Sentencing Policy (Cullompton: Willan Publishing/Federation Press,
2008).
24 See M. Tonry and S. Rex, ‘Reconsidering sentencing and punishment in Eng-
land and Wales’, in S. Rex and M. Tonry (eds), Reform and Punishment (Willan:
Cullompton, 2002).
25 For discussion of these issues, see contributions in A. Freiberg and K. Gelb
(n 23 above).
26 Without this characteristic, the guidelines may not attract suﬃcient support
from the judiciary. This was the case in Canada in the 1980s, when a Sentencing
Commission failed in part because of judicial opposition. See discussion in J.V.
Roberts and H. Bebbington, ‘Sentencing Reform in Canada: Promoting a Return to
Principles and Evidence-Based Policy’, (2013) 17(3) Canadian Criminal Law Review
327–347.
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3.1.1 Oﬀence-Speciﬁc Guidelines
Another important diﬀerence between the English and Chinese
guidelines is that the English sentencing guidelines follow an oﬀence-
speciﬁc structure. Each category of oﬀence (e.g. assault, drugs, and
sexual oﬀences) has its own deﬁnitive guideline containing oﬀence-
speciﬁc sentence ranges associated with diﬀerent levels of seriousness.
In China, general sentencing principles as well as guidance with re-
spect to speciﬁc crimes are located in a single document. The cate-
gories of crime and levels of seriousness in the Chinese guidelines are
regulated by the 1997 CL and relevant judicial interpretations in
China. This structure requires that before referring to the guidelines,
a Chinese sentencer should employ criminal codes to identify the
elements of an oﬀence with a view to establishing its relative seri-
ousness. This distinction is to some extent due to the role of sen-
tencing guidelines in the overall sentencing system. In China, the 2014
Guidelines are located within the hierarchical structure of statutes on
sentencing. They are directed and restricted by the sentencing ranges
prescribed in the 1997 CL, its amendments and relevant interpreta-
tions. The English guidelines, by contrast, exist alongside guideline
judgments from the Court of Appeal. The two sources of guidance
interact; the Council develops guidelines consistent with existing
appellate jurisprudence, and the Court of Appeal often provides
additional context and clariﬁcation for the guidelines in its judgments.
3.2 Principles and Objectives
The ﬁrst article of the Guidelines identiﬁes four objectives:
(1) structuring discretion at sentencing;
(2) implementing a policy of tempering justice with mercy;
(3) enhancing the transparency of sentencing; and
(4) promoting justice in sentencing.
The last objective is an overarching objective, achieved through ful-
ﬁlling the former three. The subsequent question is: what kind of
sentencing can be considered ‘just’? From the other three objectives,
it seems to include the following requirements: that judicial discretion
is properly exercised, that the sanctions are appropriately balanced in
terms of the severity/leniency dimension and that the sentencing
process is transparent. Transparency is a key objective of the Chinese
guidelines: to make the sentencing process comprehensible to other
participants of the procedure as well as the general public. If this
objective is achieved, it is likely to assist the accused to defend his
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case, enhance public conﬁdence in the judiciary, and to help indi-
vidual judges and local courts to resist extra-judicial interference. For
instance, when confronted with adverse public reaction to a speciﬁc
sentence, the court can point to the national guidelines to support its
decision.27
Further exploration is needed to clarify the ﬁrst two objectives.
Whether the discretionary power is properly deployed depends on the
purpose and principles of sentencing in China, which are clearly de-
scribed in the 1997 CL. Two main purposes are acknowledged in the
Criminal Law: (i) the punishment of oﬀenders and (ii) the protection
of society. Crime prevention and punishment are of course the twin
pillars of sentencing around the world. Most sentencing statutes
recognize the utilitarian (preventive) objectives of deterrence, reha-
bilitation and incapacitation as well as the retributive (just deserts)
approach which recognizes the central role of proportional punish-
ment. China’s sentencing regime therefore conforms to this dual
approach to sentencing.
Another important common element is the primordial sentencing
principle of proportionality. The key principle of sentencing in China
under the 1997 CL is to promote proportionality between the severity
of sanctions and the seriousness of the oﬀence for which sentence is
imposed. This explicit acknowledgement of the proportionality
principle is consistent with statutory sentencing schemes throughout
the common law world. For example, s 718.1 of the Criminal Code of
Canada identiﬁes proportionality as being the “fundamental” prin-
ciple guiding sentencers – one that assumes greater importance than
other principles – and section 8(a) of the Sentencing Act 2002 in New
Zealand contains a similar provision.
As to the second objective of implementing the policy of tempering
justice with mercy, it echoes the latest changes with respect to the
state strategies in China regarding crime control. The policy was ﬁrst
proposed by Luo Gan, former Secretary of the Central Politics and
Law Commission of China Communist Party, at the national
working conference of politics and law on 5 December 2005. Before
that, the dominant policy emphasized severity in crime control,
especially by means of “Severe Strike Campaigns” (SSC). The SSC is
a special strategy employed by the Chinese government in combating
27 B. Ahl, ‘Retaining Judicial Professionalism: The New Guiding Cases Mecha-
nism of the Supreme Peoples’ Court’, (2014) 217 China Quarterly 121–139.
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crime. It involves the imposition of summary, severe policies and
often the approaches adopted are far beyond rule of law.28
However, the failure of this punitive approach over the past three
decades29 and concerns over violations of the rule of law and
infringements of human rights have precipitated government re-
form.30 According to the SPC’s interpretations in 2010,31 “tempering
justice with mercy” requires the judicial system to distinguish crimes
according to their relative seriousness and to impose correspondingly
proportionate sanctions. Crimes that seriously threaten the state
(such as terrorism, or oﬀences such as homicide and rape, drug-
related crimes, and high-level corruption) should be punished with
severity. In contrast, oﬀenders committing minor crimes such as
those arising from civil disputes, or with considerable personal mit-
igation, should attract more lenient punishments.
Three other purposes are identiﬁed in the guidelines: preventing
crime; achieving parity in sentencing; and promoting a correspon-
dence between the legal and social eﬀects of sentencing.32 The ﬁrst
two purposes are also found in the English sentencing regime as well
as statutes in other countries. But what does “correspondence be-
tween legal and social eﬀect” mean? This purpose is in fact an
interpretation of “tempering justice with mercy” in sentencing. It
reﬂects the reality that, on occasion, court verdicts – although issued
28 The ﬁrst national SSC was launched in 1983. After that, there were another
three national SSC in 1996, 2001 and 2010. The former two were jointly initiated by
the SPP, SPC and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). In 2010, however, the SPP
and SPC withdrew from the campaign launched by the MPS. For discussion on SSC
in China and its eﬀect on criminal justice, see e.g. S. Trevaskes, Policing Serious Crime
in China: From ‘Strike Hard’ to ‘Kill Fewer’ (Oxon: Routledge, 2010); S. Trevaskes,
‘Severe and Swift Justice in China’, (2007) 47(1) British Journal of Criminology 23–41;
B. Liang, ‘Severe Strike Campaign in Transitional China’, (2005) 33 Journal of
Criminal Justice: 387–399; H.M. Tanner, Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaigns and
Chinese Criminal Justice 1979–1985 (New York: Cornell University East Asian
Program, 1999).
29 The annual SPP annual reports reveal that every SSC was followed by a surge in
criminal cases in the following years. Reports are available at: http://www.spp.gov.
cn/gzbg/.
30 S. Trevaskes, ‘The Shifting sands of Punishment in China in the era of “Har-
monious Society”’ (2010) 32(3) Law and Policy 332–361.
31 最高人民法院关于贯彻宽严相济刑事政策的若干意见 (‘The SPC’s Several
Opinions on Implementing the Criminal Policy of Tempering Justice with Mercy’),
法发[2010] 9号 (Fafa [2010] No. 9), (issued and validated 8 February 2010), at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-02/10/content_12960937.htm.
32 法律效果与社会效果相统一.
STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN CHINA 13
in accordance with law – are not accepted by the public. Such a
phenomenon has frequently caused social unrest, especially in the
form of constant petitioning to higher government oﬃcials.33
In England and Wales, the deﬁnitive sentencing guidelines “play
an essential role” to “ensure that courts across England and Wales
are consistent in their approach to sentencing”.34 The function of the
English guidelines is to promote greater consistency. The eﬀect of the
guidelines is expected to be internal: they focus on consistency of
approach rather than outcome. This does not mean that the English
system pays less attention to the outcomes of sentencing. According
to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, sentencing in England and Wales is
supposed to reﬂect one (or more) of ﬁve purposes: (1) the punishment
of oﬀenders; (2) the reduction of crime; (3) the reform and rehabili-
tation of oﬀenders; (4) the protection of the public; and (5) the
making of reparation by oﬀenders to persons aﬀected by their of-
fences.35 These purposes are bound by the overarching principle of
proportionality in sentencing.36
3.3 The Guidelines Methodology: Determining Sentence
Unlike the US schemes, many of which impose a two-dimensional grid
upon courts, both the Chinese and English guidelines employ a step-
by-step methodology to regulate sentencing. The Chinese Guidelines
identify three principal steps involved in reaching a sentencing deci-
sion. Step One requires the court to identify the starting point sentence
based on the essential elements of the oﬀence. This corresponds to the
ﬁrst step of the English Guidelines where a court considers the
“principal factual elements” of the oﬀence. Given that the 1997 CL
prescribes categories for most crimes, the ﬁrst step requires judges to
33 For analysis of the phenomenon of petition in China and its impact on the
formal legal system, see C.F. Minzner, ‘Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese
Legal Institutions’, (2006) 42 Stanford Journal of International Law 103–179; CF
Minzer, ‘Riots and Cover-ups: Counterproductive Control of Local Agents in
China’, (2009) 31 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 53–123; T
Zhang, ‘The Xinfang Phenomenon: Why the Chinese Prefer Administrative Peti-
tioning over Litigation’, (2008) 68 Student Scholarship Papers, at: http://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/68.
34 ‘Sentencing Guidelines’, at: http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/sentenc
ing-guidelines.htm.
35 S 142(1) of Criminal Justice Act 2003.
36 SGC, Overarching Principles: Seriousness, at: https://www.sentencingcouncil.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/web_seriousness_guideline.pdf.
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evaluate whether an act is crime and also which category of seriousness
is appropriate. Chinese criminal procedure does not distinguish stages
between conviction and sentencing; therefore Step One is also a process
of conviction. Here we use robbery as an example.37
Robbery is deﬁned under Article 263 of the 1997 CL which
speciﬁes a minimum sentence of three years’ imprisonment and a
maximum of the death penalty; these sentences constitute the outer
limits of the sentence range. The broad oﬀence of robbery is divided
two categories of seriousness: ‘conventional’ and ‘aggravated’ rob-
bery, with corresponding sentencing ranges for each category. For
conventional robbery, the sentencing range under the 1997 CL is
from three years’ to ten years’ imprisonment. With respect to the
starting point in sentencing, the 2014 Guidelines further recognizes
two sub-ranges, depending upon the oﬀender’s prior convictions. In
the absence of prior convictions for robbery, the oﬀender is liable for
a sentence with a starting point no less than three and no more than
six years’ imprisonment. If the oﬀender has prior robbery convic-
tions, the starting point of the sentence range increases to no less than
six, and no more than ten years’ custody.
Aggravated robbery is deﬁned as a robbery that contains one or
more aggravating features enumerated in the 2014 Guidelines,
including no less than three prior robberies; causing death or serious
injury; simulating a police oﬃcer during the commission of the of-
fence; using ﬁrearms to commit the crime or robbery against a mili-
tary target; or theft from emergency relief supplies. In such cases,
judges can impose any term between 10 and 13 years imprisonment as
the starting point and the sentencing range would be between 10 and
15 years’ imprisonment.38 If the potential sentence is higher than
15 years, the 2014 Guidelines no longer apply. Sentencing above the
15 year limit is therefore comparable to sentencing outside the
guideline ranges in England and Wales.
Step Two of the guidelines methodology requires a court to set the
“base” sentence by considering a range of factors that aﬀect the
constituent parts of a crime. The Guidelines do not enumerate these
37 The principal provision for robbery in the 1997 CL is Article 263. Relevant
interpretation is 最高人民法院关于审理抢劫、抢夺刑事案件适用法律若干问题的
意见 (‘SPC’s Opinions on Several Issues Concerning Applying Law in Solving
Robbery and Forcible Seizure’), 法发[2005] 第8号 (Fafa [2005] No. 8), (issued and
validated 8 June 2005) (hereinafter 2005 SPC Opinions).
38 According to the 1997 CL, the highest level of imprisonment with a ﬁxed-term is
15 years. In cases where multiple crimes have been committed, the highest level can
be raised to 25 years.
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factors but oﬀer examples – such as the amount of money involved,
the number of counts and the extent and nature of the oﬀence’s
consequences. These factors aggravate rather than mitigate the sen-
tence compared to the starting point identiﬁed in Step One.
Step Three of the Guidelines requires judges to adjust the sentence
by enhancing or reducing the baseline after considering factors
unrelated to the criminal act but relevant to the oﬀender’s level of
culpability. The 2014 Guidelines list 14 such sentencing factors,
including ten mitigating factors and four aggravating factors (see
Appendix 1).39 In this essay we shall not comment on all the factors
but rather highlight the most important. First, however, we comment
on the question of whether guidelines can oﬀer guidance in terms of
the quantum of aggravation or mitigation arising from the presence
of various sentencing factors.
3.3.1 Assigning Weights to Sentencing Factors
All jurisdictions or sentencing guidelines authority grapple with the
question of whether guidance should be provided on the quantum of
punishment that should be increased or decreased to reﬂect diﬀerent
sentencing factors. Most schemes do not provide this level of detailed
guidance, reﬂecting a view that it is not possible, a priori, to deter-
mine that a speciﬁc factor – say, remorse – should reduce the severity
of a sentence by a speciﬁed level. Indeed, it may not even be possible
to state categorically that a given factor always aggravates or always
mitigates sentence.40 In the English Guidelines, for example, with one
exception, relevant mitigating and aggravating factors are simply
listed in the deﬁnitive guidelines. The decision as to how much weight
each factor should carry is left to the discretion of individual sen-
tencers. (The one exception is the reduction for a guilty plea. A
separate, generic guideline (applicable across all cases) speciﬁes par-
ticular levels of reduction, depending upon the timing of the plea.41)
39 See Part III of the 2014 Guidelines, Appendix 1.
40 Intoxication is a good example. Under the English guidelines, committing the
oﬀence while intoxicated is an aggravating factor; however, a common plea in
mitigation is that the oﬀence was out of character and only committed because the
oﬀender had allowed himself to become excessively intoxicated. See discussion in N
Padﬁeld, ‘Intoxication as a sentencing factor: mitigation or aggravation?’, in J.V.
Roberts, Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
41 Defendants entering a plea at the ﬁrst reasonable opportunity are normally
awarded a reduction of one third. The magnitude of the reduction declines the later
the plea is entered, with pleas on the day of trial resulting in a reduction of 10%. See
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The Chinese guidelines, however, break with this tradition and pro-
vide clear numerical guidance regarding the degree to which speciﬁc
factors should aﬀect the sentence. The Guidelines provide a per-
centage-based sentencing range for each factor. For example, if the
oﬀender pleads guilty, the judge may reduce the sentence by a max-
imum of 10%.
3.3.2 Principle of Totality – Sentencing in Multiple Conviction Cases
Having arrived at a provisional sentence and before reaching a ﬁnal
disposition, judges are required to apply the “Totality” principle in sit-
uations where the oﬀender has been convicted of multiple crimes. This is
a principle stipulated in Articles 69 and 70 of the 1997 CL and, in
another departure from guidelines in other jurisdictions, the law pro-
vides instructions on the method of calculating sentences.42 Elsewhere,
guidance for multiple oﬀence cases assumes the form of a rather vague
statutory provision – for example, in the case of Canada and other
common law nations. The one exception is England and Wales, where
the Sentencing Council has issued a guideline on the application of the
Totality principle. However, even here, the guidance is ‘light touch’ in
the degree to which it restricts judicial discretion. The guideline oﬀers
only general advice with respect to the critical decision as to whether
multiple sentences ought to be served consecutively or concurrently.43
3.3.3 Summary
Two conclusions may be drawn regarding the selection of sentencing
factors in China. First, the guidelines show a striking sensitivity to
actions by the defendant which mitigate harm or reduce sentence
severity– well after the commission of the crime. The guidelines
identify a constellation of actions by the defendant which may result
in a more lenient disposition. Thus the expression of remorse, resti-
tution of property, and compensation are all identiﬁed as grounds for
Footnote 41 continued
Sentencing Council, Sentence Reductions for a Guilty Plea. Deﬁnitive Guideline (Lon-
don: Sentencing Council, 2007).
42 According to the 1997 CL, if an oﬀender is convicted of multiple crimes, except
where he is sentenced to death or life imprisonment, the term of sentence shall be less
than the total term for all the crimes but more than the term for any of the crimes.
However, the term of control cannot exceed three years, the term of criminal
detention cannot exceed one year and ﬁxed-term imprisonment cannot exceed
25 years.
43 Sentencing Council Guideline on Totality, at: http://www.sentencingcouncil.
org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deﬁnitive_guideline_TICs__totality_Final_web.pdf.
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mitigating sentence. Second, the relevance and importance of
youthfulness for sentencing is clearly recognized. All jurisdictions
have created separate sentencing regimes with greatly mitigated
sentence ranges for juvenile oﬀenders. The Chinese guidelines help-
fully go further than many other jurisdictions in that they identify the
justiﬁcations for imposing mitigated punishments on juveniles, viz,
that young oﬀenders’ diminished capacity to understand the wrong-
fulness of criminal behaviour. In addition, the guidelines create two
mitigated ranges of sentence length based on the defendant’s age.
Consistent with arrangements in England and Wales, for young
oﬀenders between 14 and 16, the sentence length imposed should be
reduced from the adult rate by between 30% and 60% while for older
juveniles, namely those between 16 and 18, the reduction should be
more modest.
3.3.4 The Role of Previous Convictions
After the seriousness of the crime, prior convictions represent the
most important determinant of sentence; this observation holds true
in both common and civil law jurisdictions.44 The magnitude of
aggravation arising from an oﬀender’s previous convictions varies
widely. Across the US, criminal history exercises great inﬂuence over
the sentence imposed, and in some State guidelines prior convictions
carry more weight than the oﬀence of conviction. Elsewhere, in
England and Wales for example, prior convictions play a more
modest role. Under the English guidelines, previous convictions are
constrained by the progressive loss of mitigation, and although repeat
oﬀenders receive harsher punishments than ﬁrst-time oﬀenders, the
aggravation attenuates after several convictions have been recorded.45
The Chinese guidelines aﬃrm the relevance of previous convic-
tions and also provide guidance as to the quantum of aggravation
that should be imposed. However, a rather diﬀerent approach is
adopted. The Guidelines provision relating to previous convictions
needs to be read in light of rules found in the 1997 law. Three cate-
gories of recidivism are distinguished. First, there is a category of
repeat oﬀender for whom the penalty should normally be aggravated:
if the prior crime resulted in a term of imprisonment; if the new crime
44 See discussion in J.V. Roberts, Punishing Persistent Offenders (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
45 J.V. Roberts and J. Pina-Sanchez, ‘Previous Convictions at Sentencing:
Exploring Empirical Trends in the Crown Court’, (2014) 8 Criminal Law Review 575–
588.
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was committed within ﬁve years of the expiry of the previous sen-
tence; and if the sentence currently imposed involves a term of cus-
tody.
The second category of oﬀender consists of those who have pre-
viously committed an oﬀence against state security and have now
been reconvicted of a subsequent oﬀence of this nature. There is no
ﬁve-year limit on this category of oﬀender. Finally, there is a third
category of recidivists who do not fulﬁll the conditions of the pre-
vious, more serious categories of recidivism. Oﬀenders in the ﬁrst two
categories should normally receive sentences between 10% and 40%
higher as a result of their previous convictions. Oﬀenders in the third
category are subject to a much smaller (10%) recidivist sentencing
enhancement, but the court has more discretion as to whether this
additional punishment will be imposed.
The guidelines are not sensitive to the relationship between the
prior and current conviction, and this distinguishes them from
guidelines and statutory law in other jurisdictions. For example, a
number of US schemes weight prior, related oﬀending more heavily,
and oﬀenders convicted of the same oﬀence on multiple occasions
play a higher price for their prior oﬀending than oﬀenders with prior
unrelated oﬀences.46 Another diﬀerence is the magnitude of the
Chinese recidivist enhancements, which are more modest than those
imposed in other jurisdictions.
Most oﬀenders will be aﬀected by s. 12 which creates a cap of 10%
on the degree to which the base sentence length may be imposed. The
relatively small (in international comparative terms) increment for
repeat identical oﬀending and the very low ceiling on the recidivist
sentencing premium for the remaining oﬀenders with prior crimes is
another way that the Chinese Guidelines promote proportional sen-
tencing. If an oﬀender-related factor such as prior record plays a very
important role, oﬀense-based proportionality is threatened, and the
drafters of the Chinese guidelines are sensitive to this threat. The
impact of the oﬀender’s prior adjudications is further limited by the
fact that the guidelines in China do not count crimes of negligence or
any juvenile convictions. In the US, both these categories of prior
delinquency count at the sentencing of adult oﬀenders.
46 J.V. Roberts, ‘Paying for the Past: The Role of Criminal Record in the Sen-
tencing Process’, in M. Tonry (ed.), Crime and Justice: A Review of Research – Volume
22 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). R. Frase et al., Criminal History
Enhancements: A Sourcebook (Minneapolis: Faculty of Law, University of Minnesota,
2015).
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Finally, one other anomaly in the Chinese Guidelines is that
previous convictions are used only as an aggravating factor and this
is a departure from common practice in other jurisdictions. All
common and civil law jurisdictions recognize that ﬁrst oﬀenders are
less blameworthy than recidivists and impose mitigated punishments
accordingly.47 Indeed, the so-called “ﬁrst oﬀender discount” is one of
the most powerful sources of mitigation at sentencing. It is surprising,
therefore, that the absence of priors is not considered as a mitigating
circumstance under the Chinese guidelines.
3.3.5 Rewarding Defendants for Co-operation with the Criminal
Justice System
The focus on encouraging oﬀender co-operation with the adminis-
tration of justice is consistent with other developments in Chinese
law. In recent years, there has been a tendency to encourage various
types of post-charge cooperation from oﬀenders. For instance,
Amendment VIII of the 1997 Criminal Law (1997 CL), which was
issued in 2011, acknowledged a confession as a relevant factor for
judicial consideration; the revision of the 1996 CPL in 2012 (2012
CPL) reformed summary procedure to facilitate guilty pleas; and the
2012 CPL also recognizes reconciliation as a special procedure to
encourage victim-oﬀender agreement. In addition, providing infor-
mation to investigators or assisting in the prosecution of other
defendants has long been recognized as a mitigating factor in China
under the heading “meritorious service”.48 Furthermore, criminal
reconciliation between oﬀenders and victims has been recognized by
the 2012 CPL.49
Post-oﬀence cooperation recognized in the 2014 Opinions can be
categorized into three types: admission of guilt, meritorious service,
and reconciliation with victims. Admission of guilt includes three
categories and the 2014 Guidelines prescribe diﬀerent maximum
sentence reductions for each: 40% for voluntary surrender before the
47 J.V. Roberts, Punishing Persistent Offenders: Community and Offender Perspec-
tives on the Recidivist Sentencing Premium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); J.
V. Roberts and A. von Hirsch (eds), Previous Convictions at Sentencing: Theoretical
and Applied Perspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
48 Article 68 of the 1997 CL.
49 Article 277 of the 2012 CPL regulates victim-oﬀender reconciliation in (1)
intentional crimes with a possible sanction of at most three years’ imprisonment; or
(2) negligent crimes with a possible sanction of at most seven years’ imprisonment.
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crime is detected,50 20% for confession at the pre-trial stage,51 and
10% for entering guilty plea in court.
The meritorious service category distinguishes ‘normal’ service
and more contributions. The key distinctions between them are (1)
whether or not the crime carries a possible sentence of no less than
lifetime imprisonment, or (2) whether or not the crime had a great
impact at either the provincial or the national level.52 The maximum
discounts for meritorious service range from 20% to 50%, and a total
exemption is possible in exceptional cases.53 Regarding victims, the
2014 Guidelines distinguish four forms: (1) criminal reconciliation
under Article 277 of the 2012 CPL; (2) the oﬀender makes compen-
sation and obtains the victim’s forgiveness, but the oﬀence of con-
viction does not fall into the scope of criminal reconciliation; (3) the
oﬀender makes compensation but the victim refuses to forgive; and
(4) the oﬀender fails to provide compensation but still obtains the
victim’s forgiveness. The corresponding discounts for these four sit-
uations range from 20% to 50%.
The levels of credits in three categories reﬂect several objectives.
For admissions of guilt, the purpose is to encourage early coopera-
tion, and therefore the general rule is the earlier the plea, the higher
the discount – an arrangement which corresponds to plea-based
sentence reductions in England and Wales, as well as other western
jurisdictions. In the case of meritorious service, the main purpose is to
facilitate the investigation, prosecution and conviction of other
criminal suspects, and therefore the general principle is that the more
valuable the assistance in solving other crimes, the higher the dis-
count. As to reconciliation with victims, both ﬁnancial compensation
and the victim’s forgiveness are emphasized as two primary objec-
tives.
50 Voluntary surrender regarding minor crimes may qualify the oﬀender for more
than 40% sentencing discount or even a total exemption, see Section 4 of the 2014
Guidelines.
51 Confession of crimes of the same type as the conviction but of a higher seri-
ousness can get the oﬀender up to 30% sentencing discount and confessions that
prevent extremely serious consequences can attract reductions of up to 50%. Sec-
tion 6 of the 2014 Opinions.
52 最高人民法院关于处理自首和立功具体应用法律若干问题的解释 (‘The SPC
Interpretations on Several Legal Issues on the Application of Voluntary Surrender
and Meritorious Performance’), 法释[1998] 8号 (Fashi [1998] No. 8) (issued and
validated 9 May 1998), at: http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=13925.
53 Section 5 of the 2014 Opinions.
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To conclude, both the English and Chinese guidelines encourage
courts to follow a systematic methodology at sentencing. The English
guidelines require courts to work through nine steps54: (1) determine
the category of seriousness of the case; (2) shape the provisional
sentence to reﬂect relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, some
of which are speciﬁed in the guidelines; (3) reduce the sentence to
reﬂect any assistance the oﬀender provided to the State; (4) reduce the
sentence to reﬂect a guilty plea; (5) consider application of the dan-
gerousness criteria, if relevant; (6) apply the totality principle, if rel-
evant; (7) consider imposing a compensation order or other orders;
(8) give reasons for the sentence; (9) award credit for any time spent
on remand or bail.55 The ﬁrst six steps are also found in the Chinese
Guidelines. As the 2014 Guidelines apply only to imprisonment and
criminal detention, other penalties relevant to step seven in the
English Guidelines are not included. As to step nine, the recognition
of pre-trial detention or supervision is explicitly encapsulated in the
1997 CL in China and it is not within judges’ discretion.
The principal distinction between the English and Chinese
guidelines is found at Step Eight of the former which requires courts
to give reasons for their sentencing decisions. Since this step is crucial
in examining judges’ compliance with the sentencing guidelines and
has special importance for oﬀenders and other stakeholders, the
compliance issue is examined separately in the next section of this
paper.
IV REQUIREMENT FOR COURTS TO COMPLY WITH
GUIDELINES AND TO EXPLAIN SENTENCE
A key issue to be resolved in the construction of guidelines is the
degree of constraint that is imposed upon courts. Although as noted,
in Minnesota the guidelines are presumptively binding on courts, in
some other US jurisdictions, guidelines are merely advisory. As with
other regulations issued by the SPC, the 2014 Guidelines are binding
upon all courts across the country. This is consistent with guideline
schemes in other jurisdictions such as England and Wales where the
compliance requirement has recently been strengthened. The Cor-
54 Although the Council’s ﬁrst deﬁnitive guideline (for assault oﬀences) adopts a
nine-step methodology, some more recent guidelines issued by the Council have used
a diﬀerent approach (for examples and explanation, see the Sentencing Council
website, at: http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk).
55 J.V. Roberts (n 7 above).
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oners and Justice Act 2009 (CJA 2009) amended the term “have regard
to” in the previous statute (the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA 2003))
to “should follow” and this stricter compliance requirement is bind-
ing upon the magistrates’ courts and the Crown court.56
Unlike their English counterparts, however, Chinese judges are
not obliged to give reasons or to explain, for the beneﬁt of the of-
fender, the eﬀect and consequences of the sentence. Before 2010, most
verdicts were unavailable to the public in China, a state of aﬀairs that
can only impede public understanding of sentencing. In that year, the
SPC began to publish courts’ verdicts online although it was not
implemented on a national level until the end of 2013, when the SPC
promulgated Regulations on Publishing Verdicts of Peoples’ Courts
Online.57 According to this document, verdicts of peoples’ courts on
every level should be published online except for those (1) involving
state secrets or individual privacy; (2) involving juveniles; (3) resolved
through mediation; and (4) other “improper” situations (Article 4).
The new scheme provided an opportunity to explore judges’ rea-
soning and decision-making processes as well as their compliance
with the 2014 Guidelines. However, some deﬁciencies in sentencing
judgments are clear. To illustrate these defects, we refer to a recent
judgment.58
In this case, the court recorded a conviction of intentional injury
against Wang. The oﬀender was interrogated by the police as a result
of his suspicious behaviour. He confessed and subsequently pleaded
guilty in court, decisions which can result in a more lenient punish-
ment. Wang played a lesser role in the oﬀence and this justiﬁes
additional leniency. According to section 1 of Article 234, section 1 of
Article 25 and section 1 of Article 67 of the 1997 CL and Article 1 of
the SPC Interpretations on Several Issues in Applying Law on
Dealing with Voluntary Surrender and Meritorious Service,59 the
court sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment.
56 For discussion on the evolution of the requirement on compliance in English
sentencing guidelines, see J.V. Roberts, ‘Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Dis-
cretion’, (2011) 51 British Journal of Criminology 997–1013.
57 人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定,法释[2013] 26号 (Fashi [2013] No. 26)
(issued 21 November 2013, validated 1 January 2014), at: http://www.court.gov.cn/
qwfb/sfjs/201311/t20131129_189898.htm. According to these Regulations, verdicts
must be published on the oﬃcial website Judicial Opinions of China, at: http://www.
court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/.
58 (2014) 鄂汉阳未刑初字(Ehanyangweixingchuzi) No. 00034.
59 法释[1998] 8号 (Fashi [1998] No. 8) (issued and validated 9 May 1998).
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The judgment in this case has several defects. First, it summarises
facts rather than providing a thorough exegesis of the court’s rea-
soning. The peoples’ court’s arguments on conviction and sentence
are normally compressed into one paragraph after the summary of
case facts and evidence. There is no way of determining whether the
court followed the guidelines’ recommended ranges of increase or the
reductions for various sentencing factors. Second, aggravating factors
and mitigating factors are simply noted; there is no indication pro-
vided of their impact upon the sentence imposed. Third, verdicts do
not identify the starting point and baseline for the court’s calcula-
tions. Sometimes the credit for speciﬁc factors can be inferred from
the appellate judgment, where the original sentence is modiﬁed. For
instance, in Li X case in 2013, the sentence was reduced from three
years’ imprisonment to two years and nine months’ imprisonment – a
reduction of approximately 10% – in recognition of the defendant’s
voluntary surrender.60 This is, however, still far from the maximum
40% prescribed in SPC’s sentencing guidelines, and no reasons are
provided to explain the starting point, the baseline, and the factors
considered by a court when it awarded credit for voluntary surrender.
In comparison, since courts must give reasons for departing from
the guidelines, it is easier to examine the relationship between judicial
decisions and sentencing guidelines in England and Wales, with a
view to determining whether a court has discharged its statutory duty
to “follow any relevant guideline”. Judgments issued since the cre-
ation of the deﬁnitive guidelines more often provide a detailed cal-
culus of the factors aﬀecting the nature and quantum of punishment
imposed.61 The more detailed judgments found in the Crown court in
England and Wales also facilitate appellate review. For example, if a
court notes that the oﬀender was awarded a one-quarter sentence
length reduction for having entered a guilty plea, the Court of Appeal
can compare this to the prescribed guideline recommendation, and
intervene if necessary. Appellate review is likely to be far more
challenging in China.
60 See (2013) 二中刑终字(Erzhongxingzhongzi) No. 1987, 2nd Intermediate Peo-
ples’ Court in Beijing.
61 See e.g. R v Kiely [2009] EWCA Crim para 756.
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V CONCLUSION
Although it is too early to determine the eﬀects of the 2014 Guide-
lines, some challenges are clear, the principal of which is how to
monitor departures and evaluate the impact of the guidelines in the
absence of any sentencing data. Although the Chinese guidelines aim
to enhance public conﬁdence and resist extra-judicial interference in
sentencing, the sentencing process still remains opaque in individual
cases, as little additional information can be gleaned from the judg-
ments. In light of this, it seems unlikely that public skepticism and
cynicism about sentencing will be mitigated by the new Guidelines, at
least as long as those statutory directions are not reﬂected in speciﬁc,
publicly-available judgments.
Second, although both the Anglo-Welsh and Chinese guidelines
employ starting point sentences and sentencing ranges for diﬀerent
categories of seriousness, in China, the former also refer to a range
rather than a speciﬁc number. Chinese judges have to determine their
own starting point sentences. This element of the guidelines is con-
sistent with the approach adopted by the Sentencing Reform Act in
Israel.62 As a result of that statute, courts in Israel have to develop
their own starting point and sentence ranges, unlike the English or
US-based guidelines which provide this information to the court.
The third challenge is the signiﬁcant degree of judicial discretion
that remains under the new guidelines. For example, for the oﬀence
of robbery, the guidelines only help judges to locate the starting point
more accurately and do little to restrict the eﬀective range of sentence.
Even if an oﬀender falls into the ﬁrst range (with a starting point
between three and six years’ imprisonment), the ﬁnal sentence can
still be as high as ten years’ custody. This is due to the fact that the
current interpretations have not speciﬁed and classiﬁed the situations
within a certain range. As judicial interpretations, the 2014 Guideli-
nes can only prescribe detailed sentencing ranges based on existing
regulations rather than inventing new criminal codes.
The fourth challenge to the 2014 Guidelines in China concerns the
dispersed regulations on sentencing. The guidelines are merely part of
the relevant sentencing rules, and their eﬀect cannot be guaranteed
without being coordinated with criminal codes and judgments.
Again, we cite robbery as an example. The 2014 Guidelines are not
applicable to oﬀenders who are liable to life imprisonment or the
62 For text of the sentencing law and commentary thereon, see V. Roberts and O.
Gazal-Ayal (n 6 above).
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death penalty. Nevertheless, the second range of robbery encom-
passes sentencing from ten years’ imprisonment to capital punish-
ment, and there are no speciﬁc rules on the exercise of discretion
between these limits. In other words, the cases described in the
guidelines for normal imprisonment may also result in much more
severe sanctions. At present, the longest period of imprisonment with
a ﬁxed term for a single crime is 15 years. The gap between this
sentence and life imprisonment and even the death penalty is great
and needs to be restricted by means of clearer directions to courts.
It is easier to diagnose problems than to prescribe remedies. The
great regional variation in ethnicity, religion, history and culture
across China means that national sentencing guidelines may be
harder to implement than in other, more homogeneous jurisdictions
such as Minnesota, England and Wales, New Zealand or South
Korea, all of which have adopted guidelines. From a long-term
perspective, solutions to the challenges rely on systematic coordina-
tion among criminal law, judicial interpretations and sentencing
guidelines. However, in the short-term, some lessons still can be
drawn from the English experience.
5.1 Monitoring and Evaluating the Guidelines
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 requires the English Council to
monitor the operation and eﬀect of the deﬁnitive guidelines. As a result
of this duty, the CrownCourt Sentencing Survey (CCSS) was launched
inEngland andWales to determine the level of judicial compliancewith
the guidelines.63 To date, neither the SPC nor the local judiciary in
China have introduced a court-based survey of this kind. Therefore, no
data are available to evaluate the compliance rate or the eﬀects of the
2014Guidelines on judicial practice.A national data collection exercise
to establish levels of compliance with the guidelines is therefore an
important priority. Without this step, it is impossible to monitor
judicial compliance with the guidelines or to evaluate the impact of the
guidelines on judicial behaviour.This iswhy the SentencingCouncil for
England andWales created a bespoke survey that collects data directly
from the sentencing authority – the court. Sentencing Commissions
across theUS achieve the same result bymeans of a “departure” report;
this is a formcompleted by the judge every time a sentence imposed falls
63 For a general introduction and the latest ﬁndings from the survey, see J.V.
Roberts, ‘Complying with Sentencing Guidelines: Latest Findings from the Crown
Court Sentencing Survey’, in A. Ashworth and J.V. Roberts (n 3 above).
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outside the guideline ranges. A database of sentencing decisions is
necessary not only to permit an evaluation of the guidelines’ eﬀec-
tiveness, but also to revise and amend the existing guidelines over time.
Again, the experience in England and Wales is instructive. The Sen-
tencing Council in that jurisdiction employs its survey of courts to
revise existing guidelines aswell as to determine sentence ranges for new
guidelines.
5.2 Conclusion
China is the latest example of a jurisdiction seeking to impose
structure on judicial discretion at sentencing. As such, the guidelines
reﬂect, and build upon, developments elsewhere. These guidelines
reﬂect a world-wide trend towards more structured sentencing. Very
diverse legal regimes have introduced constraints upon the wide
discretion that courts have typically enjoyed at sentencing. This
evolution suggests a growing consensus that while discretion is nec-
essary to ensure individualization, guidelines are also required to
promote more principled and consistent sentencing.
The Chinese guidelines provide a systematic methodology to guide
courts at sentencing, as well as comparatively detailed and prescrip-
tive guidance regarding the consideration of important sentencing
factors. To the extent that they are faithfully applied across courts,
the guidelines are likely to have beneﬁcial eﬀects in terms of pro-
moting more consistent and more principled sentencing. Moreover, in
light of the importance, both regionally and globally of the Chinese
state, the experience with this new approach to sentencing is likely to
be emulated by other jurisdictions, particularly across Asia.
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VI APPENDIX 1: THE 2014 CHINESE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES64
The following guidelines are drafted to structure sentencing discre-
tion and implement the policy of combining criminal punishments
with leniency in order to promote more open and fair sentencing.
I. Guiding Principles for Sentencing
1. Sentencing shall have facts as its basis and the law as its measure.
The sentence shall be determined according to the facts of the
oﬀence, including the nature, circumstances and degree of social
harm caused.
2. Sentencing shall reﬂect both the seriousness of the criminal act
and the degree of the oﬀender’s culpability, such that the penalty
is proportionate to the crime, and the goals of punishing and
preventing crimes are achieved.
3. Sentencing shall reﬂect a policy of balancing leniency with
severity to deliver lenient sentences when appropriate and severe
when appropriate.
4. Sentencing should reﬂect variation in economic and social
development as well as public security concerns in order to fulﬁll
the aims of the criminal law. In cases that are comparable in
terms of facts, region and timing, the sentences imposed shall be
fundamentally proportionate.
II. Sentencing Methodology
Sentencing should be based on a qualitative analysis combined with
quantitative analysis in order to determine the “Starting Point”
sentence, the “Base” sentence and the “Declared” sentence.
1. Sentencing Steps
(1) The Starting Point sentence is determined within the relevant
statutory penalty range on the basis of the facts constituting the
crime;
(2) The “Base” sentence is determined by increasing the starting
point sentence in light of other factors aﬀecting the nature of a
crime, such as the degree of harm, the number of counts and any
other consequences of the crime;
64 Note: translation by the authors, based on SPC Guiding Opinion on Sentencing
of Common Crimes (2014), at: http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/spc-guiding-
opinion-on-sentencing-of-common-crimes-2014/.
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(3) The “declared sentence” is determined in accordance with law
by adjusting the base sentence according to the sentencing cir-
cumstances and after considering all factors of the case as a
whole.
2. Procedure for Adjusting the Base Sentence
(1) Where there is a single sentencing circumstance, directly adjust
the base sentence accordingly.
(2) Where there are multiple sentencing circumstances, the base
sentence is adjusted by weighing relevant aggravating and mit-
igating factors. Where there are sentencing circumstances such
as a crime committed by a juvenile oﬀender, an elderly oﬀender,
an oﬀender who is mentally ill or with limited mental capacity,
or a deaf-mute or blind oﬀender; or for unjustiﬁed self-defense,
excessive necessity, criminal preparation, an attempted crime, or
an aborted crime; or where one is an accessory or accomplice
under duress or an abettor; ﬁrst use those sentencing circum-
stances to adjust the base sentence and use other sentencing
circumstances to make subsequent adjustments to that base
sentence.
(3) Where the defendant has committed a number of crimes and
also has relevant sentencing circumstances such as meritorious
contributions or repeat oﬀences applicable to each oﬀence, ﬁrst,
apply those sentencing circumstances to adjust each crime’s base
sentence and determine the penalty that should be given for each
oﬀence, then decide on the punishment to be imposed by com-
bining the punishment for several oﬀences in accordance with
law.
3. Determining the Declared Sentence
(1) Where the result of adjusting the base sentence falls within the
statutory range and is commensurate with the oﬀender’s cul-
pability, it may be directly imposed as the declared sentence; if
there are circumstances that should mitigate punishment, a de-
clared sentence below the statutory minimum should be im-
posed.
(2) Where the result of adjusting the base sentence based on the
sentencing circumstances results in a sentence below the statu-
tory minimum penalty, there are circumstances that mitigate the
punishment and the penalty is commensurate with culpability, it
may be directly imposed as the declared sentence. Where there
are only mitigating circumstances, the statutory minimum sen-
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tence may be determined as the declared sentence in accordance
with law. However, based on the facts of a given case and upon
review and approval from the Supreme Peoples’ Court, a pun-
ishment below the statutory minimum may be imposed.
(3) Where the result of adjusting the base sentence based on the
sentencing circumstances is above the statutory maximum, the
imposed sentence may rise to the maximum statutory penalty in
accordance with law.
(4) Considering all case circumstances, a sole judge or judicial panel
may make adjustments to the base sentence within a range of
20% when determining the declared sentence. Where, after
adjustment, the result still fails to meet the requirement of
rendering the punishment proportionate to the crime, it should
be referred to the adjudication committee for discussion and
determination of a declared sentence in accordance with law.
(5) Where on comprehensive consideration of all case facts and
circumstances, a punishment of life imprisonment or higher,
supervised release, independent use of a supplementary pun-
ishment, a suspended sentence or waiver of punishment is im-
posed, it shall be applied in accordance with law.
III. Application of Common Sentencing Factors
At sentencing, all statutory and discretionary sentencing circum-
stances should be considered and the application for each sentencing
factor lawfully determined on the basis the facts of the case and other
relevant circumstances. When determining the sentence for oﬀences
that inﬂict serious harm (such as seriously violent crimes and drug
crimes), the punishment shall be severe. When the crime is relatively
minor, the punishment shall be lenient. When determining the
adjustment for each relevant circumstance, the adjustment range and
the actual increase or mitigation shall be balanced to ensure that the
punishment is proportionate to the oﬀender’s degree of responsibility
for the oﬀence.
1. For juvenile crimes, the juvenile’s capacity to understand the
crime, motive for committing a crime, age at the time of the
oﬀence, whether they are a ﬁrst or casual oﬀender, expressions of
repentance, personal experiences and demeanor shall be consid-
ered, and a lenient punishment imposed.
(1) For crimes committed by minors who are between 14 and
16 years of age, reduce the base sentence by 30–60%;
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(2) For crimes committed by minors who have reached the age of
16 but are under the age of 18 years of age, reduce the base
sentence by 10–50%.
2. For inchoate oﬀences, the courts shall consider circumstances
such as the extent to which the crime was completed or inchoate,
the extent of the harm caused and the reason why the crime was
uncompleted. The base sentence may be reduced up to 50% of
that imposed for the completed oﬀence.
3. For accessories to a crime, their position and role in the common
oﬀence shall be considered along with whether or not they carried
out the oﬀence and other such relevant circumstances. This
should result in a lenient punishment, reducing the base sentence
by 20–50%. Where the oﬀence is minor, reduce the base sentence
by 50% or more, or the punishment may be waived entirely.
4. For voluntary surrender, courts should consider the motive,
timing and conditions of the surrender, the seriousness of the
crime, the veracity of the oﬀender’s account of the oﬀence, and
any expression of remorse. Thereafter, the base sentence may be
reduced by up to 40%. Where the oﬀence is minor, the base
sentence may be reduced by more than 40% or the punishment
waived entirely. This does not include misuse of the voluntary
surrender provisions to avoid legal sanctions and other situations
insuﬃcient to justify lenient punishment.
5. For meritorious contributions to society, courts should consider
the magnitude, content, motivation and eﬀect of the meritorious
contributions, as well as the seriousness of the oﬀence in order to
determine the extent of leniency.
(1) Where there is an ordinary meritorious contribution, the base
sentence may be reduced by up to 20%;
(2) Where there is an extraordinarily meritorious contribution,
the base sentence may be reduced by 20–50%, and where the
crime is minor, reduce the base sentence by 50% or more, or
waive punishment entirely.
6. For confessions, consider circumstances such as the stage when
the oﬀender truthfully disclosed the criminal conduct, the extent,
the gravity of the crime and the degree to which they express
repentance, in order to determine the degree of leniency.
(1) Where an oﬀender honestly confesses his criminal acts, the
base sentence may be reduced by up to 20%;
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(2) Where an oﬀender honestly confesses similar serious criminal
acts that the justice system was unaware of, the base sentence
may be reduced by 10–30%;
(3) Where an especially serious consequence is avoided as a result
of the oﬀender’s disclosure, the base sentence may be reduced
by 30–50%.
7. Where the crime is voluntarily admitted at court, the base sen-
tence may be reduced by up to 10% on the basis of circumstances
such as the nature of the crime, the seriousness of the crime, the
extent of the confession and expressions of remorse. This does
not include those veriﬁed as voluntary surrender or confessions.
8. For the return of unlawful gains or restitution, the base sentence
may be reduced by up to 30% on consideration of the nature of
the crime, the degree to which the return or restitution can oﬀset
the harm and the amount of restitution. Crimes of robbery and
other crimes that seriously harm social order should be punished
severely.
9. Where the victim’s economic losses have been compensated and
their forgiveness obtained, the base sentence may be reduced by
up to 40% on consideration of the nature of the crime, the
amount of compensation, the oﬀender’s ability to make com-
pensation and the degree to which the crime is admitted and
repented. Where there is active compensation but forgiveness is
not forthcoming, the base sentence may be reduced by up to
30%. Where forgiveness exists even though there was no com-
pensation, the base sentence may be reduced by up to 20%.
Crimes that seriously threaten public security (such as robbery or
rape) should be punished severely.
10. Where parties reach a settlement in accordance with Article 277
of the Criminal Procedure Law, the base sentence may be reduced
by up to 50% on consideration of the nature of the crime, the
amount of compensation, formal apologies and genuine repen-
tance; where the crime is minor, the base punishment may be
reduced by 50% or more or punishment may be waived entirely.
11. For repeat oﬀences, the base punishment shall be increased by
10–40% on consideration of the nature of the previous and
subsequent crimes, the length of the period of time between
completing or being released from a previous punishment and the
commission of a new crime, as well as the seriousness of the
previous and subsequent crimes.
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12. For oﬀenders with criminal records, courts shall consider cir-
cumstances such the nature of the prior convictions, the length of
time since the previous convictions and the severity of the sen-
tence imposed for the previous oﬀences. The base sentence may
be increased by up to 10%. This does not include prior convic-
tions for criminal negligence or juvenile crimes.
13. Where the victim of a crime is a minor, a senior, a disabled
person, a pregnant woman or other vulnerable person, courts
shall consider circumstances such as the nature of the oﬀence and
the seriousness of the oﬀence and the base sentence may be in-
creased by up to 20%.
14. For crimes committed during major natural disasters or during
the prevention and control of an infectious disease outbreak, the
base sentence may be increased by up to 20%, according to the
speciﬁc circumstances of the case.
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